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Abstract: This article approaches the position of the call to prayer (adhan or azan) in South Africa
from the perspective of both legislation and case law. Although only an unamplified adhan has
religious status in Islam, Muslim religious authorities (ulama) have since the twentieth century
also approved of, and permitted, an amplified adhan. The adhan has been rendered in both forms
from South African mosques (masjids) for some 223 years. However, the unamplified adhan has
recently come under the legal and judicial spotlight when the volume of its rendering by human
voice was restricted. In August 2020, after prior attempts at municipal level and mediation had been
unsuccessful, a high court in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, ruled that the sound of the unamplified
adhan emanating from a mosque located on the premises of an Islamic institution (madrassa) in the
city of Durban should not be audible within the house situated on nearby property belonging to a
Hindu neighbor. Wide media coverage reported that the ruling was publicly decried and met with
criticism. The Madrassa lodged an appeal in September 2020 and the matter is ongoing. The High
Court’s decision is binding in KwaZulu-Natal, a province where Hindus, as a religious minority, are
concentrated. The article highlights that although the decision is not binding on similar courts in
other provinces, its outcome may yet have far-reaching consequences for the adhan as a religious and
cultural heritage symbol, and for religious symbols generally, because similar complaints have been
lodged, albeit against amplified adhans, against several mosques located in major cities (Cape Town
and Tshwane) of two other provinces where Muslims, as a religious minority, are largely concentrated.
The article examines the adhan in the context of competing constitutional rights to religious freedom
and property (neighbor law) in South Africa. The article proffers some recommendations for the way
forward in South Africa based in some instances on the position of the adhan in several countries. It
concludes that, ultimately, unamplified, unduly amplified and duly amplified adhans may all yet be
found to constitute a noise nuisance in South Africa, if challenged and found to be unreasonable.
Keywords: Muslim call to prayer (adhan or azan); unamplified; amplified; loudspeakers; mosques
(masjids); constitution; freedom of religion; cultural heritage; religious symbol; property rights;
neighbor law; noise nuisance; noise pollution; South Africa; Indonesia; India
1. Introduction
This article approaches the position of the call to prayer (adhan1 or azan) in South
Africa from the perspective of both legislation and case law. Although only an unamplified
adhan, vocalized purely by human voice without the aid of a loudspeaker, has religious
status in Islam, Muslim religious authorities (ulama) have since the twentieth century also
approved of, and permitted, an amplified adhan.
Currently, Muslims constitute the largest of several religious minorities in a predomi-
nantly Christian South Africa. During a period of Dutch and British colonization, Muslims
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were only formally accorded religious freedom some 150 years after their arrival from In-
donesia and India in the mid-seventeenth century. Since then the adhan has been rendered
in both unamplified and amplified forms from South African mosques (masjids) for some
223 years. However, the unamplified adhan has recently come under the legal and judicial
spotlight.
On 21 August 2020 Judge S B Mngadi, in Ellaurie v Madrasah Taleemuddeen Islamic
Institute and Another2 (hereafter, the Ellaurie case) ruled that the sound of the unamplified
adhan emanating from a mosque located on the premises of Madrasah Taleemuddeen
(hereafter, the Madrassa3) should not be audible within the house situated on nearby
property belonging to Mr. Ellaurie, a Hindu neighbor. In 2003 and 2004 Mr. Ellaurie had
lodged similar complaints about the sound of the adhan emanating from the Madrassa’s
mosque, respectively, with the EThekwini Municipality (which has jurisdiction in the area
on such matters) and the South African Human Rights Commission (hereafter, the SAHRC).
His complaints then included a second nearby community mosque, the Isipingo Beach
Mosque, which renders adhans through amplification. As a consequence of the outcome of
the Ellaurie case, the Madrassa was ordered to reduce the volume of an unamplified adhan,
thus impacting on its religious and associated manifestation and the group rights of its
students and staff members. As a consequence of wide media coverage, Mr. Ellaurie was
also characterized as an “Islamophobe”.
On 4 September 2020, the Madrassa (the first respondent) lodged a notice of applica-
tion for leave to appeal the High Court’s decision “ . . . to the Supreme Court of Appeal
[SCA], alternatively the Full Court of the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, against the whole
of the judgment and order of Mngadi J”4. On 26 March 2021, the leave to appeal was not
granted by Mngadi J and an appeal to the SCA against that ruling is being considered.5
In a nutshell, the Madrassa contends that the judgment is flawed as there is a disconnect
between the law and the facts of the case. The Judge, in his reasoning and ruling, was
criticized by the Madrassa for failing to weigh up and balance the competing human
rights interests of the parties pertaining to religious freedom and property (which includes
neighbor law), and to apply the common law nuisance principles (which form part of
neighbor law) and appropriate case law. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996 (hereafter, the final or 1996 Constitution) makes provision for the accommodation of
the adhan (and other religious symbols) in a plural South Africa. Although not banned,
its manifestation may be restricted if found to be unreasonable. The article examines Mr.
Ellaurie’s noise nuisance complaint to determine whether it was reasonable and whether
or not the legal validity and rationale of the judgment, and therefore its outcome, may
be questioned. There is the likelihood that the case may yet proceed all the way to the
Constitutional Court (CC) which is the highest (or apex) court in South Africa for constitu-
tional matters, while the SCA, formerly the Appellate Division (AD), is the highest court
for criminal and civil cases.
KwaZulu-Natal is one of nine provinces of South Africa where Hindus as a religious
minority are concentrated. Although the doctrine of stare decisis6, which entails that where
facts are similar courts are bound by previous decisions, is part of South African law, the
decision in one province is not binding in another. The article highlights that the Ellaurie
case may nevertheless yet have far-reaching consequences for the adhan, and for religious
symbols generally, because similar complaints have been lodged, albeit against the use of
amplified adhans, against several mosques7 located in Cape Town, in the Western Cape
province, and Tshwane (formerly Pretoria) in the Gauteng province. These are also major
cities where Muslims are largely concentrated. Classical Islamic tradition provides little
guidance to Muslims as to how to live as minorities.8 The article, therefore, also explores
the possibility of unamplified adhans being allowed unrestricted rendering in areas where
Muslims, as a religious minority, are concentrated, and where historical areas and mosques
have been accorded protected status as cultural heritage sites. The article proffers some
recommendations for the way forward in South Africa based in some instances on the
position of the adhan in several countries and the lessons they may hold. It concludes that,
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ultimately, unamplified, unduly amplified and duly amplified adhans may all yet be found
to constitute a noise nuisance in South Africa, if challenged, and found to be unreasonable.
This article is accordingly divided into seven Sections, including this introduction
(Section 1) and the conclusions (Section 7) as follows:
Section 2 (i) briefly examines the religious origin and purpose of the early unamplified
and later amplified forms of adhan in order to highlight why they are an integral part of
the current practice of Islam. Section 2 (ii) examines the historical origin of both forms of
adhan in South Africa and its possible status as a protected cultural heritage symbol. It
briefly examines past legal discriminations against Muslims in support of the argument (in
Section 4) that, in order to avoid past injustices, religious diversity should be celebrated,
protected and tolerated.
In South Africa, religious symbols like the adhan may constitute a “noise nuisance”
and may be regulated at national, provincial or municipal levels.9 The South African
Constitution empowers municipalities to both pass and manage their own by-laws. These
by-laws have the same legal status as other national and provincial legislation.10 Although
the EThekwini Municipality (second respondent) did not participate in the case, the prop-
erties of Mr. Ellaurie and the Madrassa fall under its jurisdiction. Section 3, therefore,
briefly examines the complaint lodged by Mr. Ellaurie with the Municipality; the SAHRC
mediation process and its reported recommendations; and the facts and outcome of the
Ellaurie case mainly in so far as they pertain to the mosque belonging to the Madrassa.
Although Mr. Ellaurie’s complaint in the High Court did not include the Isipingo Beach
community mosque, brief reference will be made to this mosque and the recommendations
pertaining to it insofar as they may shed further light on the case.
Section 4 deals with municipal complaints received about the rendering of the adhan
in Cape Town and Gauteng both before and after the Ellaurie case.
Section 5 provides an analysis of competing constitutional rights to religious freedom
and property in the context of the Ellaurie case in order to determine whether or not its
outcome was justified.
Section 6 proffers some recommendations as to the way forward in South Africa
(based in some instances on the position of the adhan in several countries) which may assist
courts dealing with matters pertaining to the adhan, and includes co-operation between
local ulama (Muslim religious authorities) and the municipalities (as representatives of
the State).
2. The Adhan as a Religious Symbol and as a Cultural Heritage Symbol in
South Africa
This Section highlights that the adhan is a symbol of both religious and cultural
significance for Muslims in South Africa.
(i) The adhan as a religious symbol
The adhan is an important practice for the Islamic faith. The origin of the ritual and
recitation of the unamplified adhan, by a muezzin (English word derived from the Arabic
word “mu’addin”) in the Arabic language and in wording that is still in current use, can
be traced back to Prophet Muhammad (on whom be peace) and the foundations of Islam
in the seventh century. Muhammad wanted to upgrade a then simplified version of the
adhan and was inspired by the sounding of the Christian church bell and the Jewish ram’s
horn (shofar) to introduce the adhan as a dedicated symbol in Islam.11 The amplified
adhan involving loudspeakers is a more recent innovation. Saudi Arabia (“seat of Islam”),
followed by Pakistan12 and Singapore13, began to use loudspeakers to broadcast the adhan
during the 1950s.
The Qur’an (holy book of Islam) revealed to the Prophet Muhammad and his Sunna
(received custom or traditions associated with him) are the two primary sources of Islamic
legislation.14 Muhammad’s traditions were collected in book form, known as ahadith
(singular, hadith), after his death.15 While there are several Qur’anic verses16 enjoining
believers to pray at “stated times” which may allude to the historical foundation of the
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adhan, the Qur’an does not specifically refer to the adhan. According to the Islamic law
(Shari’a) established by the jurists of the four main Sunnite (Hanafite, Malikite, Shafi’ite
and Hanbalite) schools of Islamic thought (madhahib, singular: madhhab), the adhan is a
Sunna (tradition) established by the Prophet through his personal intervention. Although,
therefore, not compulsory, the unamplified adhan is a strongly recommended practice,
especially given the fact that Muhammad’s Sunna is second in status only to that of the
Qur’an. When reference to the adhan is made, as it is in several ahadith, it is taken seriously
by Muslims because it embodies his Sunna.
The five obligatory daily prayers constitute one (the second) of the five pillars of
Islam.17 These five prayers are thus each preceded by the rendering of an adhan primarily
to invite Muslims to perform these prayers and to inform them of the arrival of the time for
prayer. The Qur’an18 dictates the timing of the five prayers to occur in the morning before
sunrise (named “fajr” in Arabic); the afternoon (named “thuhr” or “dhuhr” in Arabic);
the late afternoon (named “asr” in Arabic); the evening after sunset (named “maghrib” in
Arabic); and late at night (named “isha” in Arabic). Factors, such as, location, season and
climate, may also play a contributing role. The cycle repeats itself for 365 days of the year
and there is no option of occasional occurrences. The adhan for each prayer usually lasts
for some three to five minutes.
The wording of the adhan is essentially a summary of Islamic belief. It has been
translated into English as follows:
“Allāh [God] is most great. I testify that there is no god but Allāh. I testify that
Muh. ammad is the prophet of Allāh. Come to prayer. Come to salvation [success].
Allāh is most great. There is no god but Allāh.”19
The adhan begins with an affirmation of the supremacy of God, followed by a profes-
sion of faith (consisting of the unity of God, the negation of polytheism, and the confirma-
tion that Muhammad is his Messenger). The actual call to prayer (“come to prayer”) only
comes after these phrases. Each line is repeated for emphasis.
Singled out for the first (fajr) call to prayer is the additional line: “prayer is better
than sleep”.
During the COVID-19 lockdown period, muezzins in South Africa were allowed to
physically render amplified adhans from mosques. In doing so, they simply replaced the
line of the adhan “come to prayer”, with the line “pray at home”.
(ii) The adhan as a cultural heritage symbol
When 1994 (27 years ago) finally marked the end of apartheid (politically motivated
racial segregation) in South Africa, the footprint of Islam had already been firmly rooted
in the South African soil for over three and a half centuries. Although a minority group,
the history of South African Muslims is inextricably intertwined with South Africa’s
history of colonialism (the Dutch followed by the British), apartheid, and constitutional
democracy. Muslims first arrived as slaves and political exiles on the shores of Cape Town
in the mid-17th century, when the Dutch brought them to the Cape from their colonies
in the Indonesian Archipelago and India.20 A far cry from section 15 of the final South
African Constitution, which guarantees Muslims (and other religious minorities) the right
to freedom of religion and belief, in 1657 the Dutch introduced a set of laws (the Statutes
of India or Code of Batavia (present-day Jakarta) drafted by then Batavian governor Van
Diemen in 1642)) which prohibited the public practice of Islam.21 As a consequence,
Muslims were forced to practice their religion in private and no public congregations
were allowed.
Muslims were only formally granted religious freedom by the Dutch authorities in
1804, 150 years after their arrival.22 However, its practical implementation was still being
hampered during a period of British rule and Muslims still required permission to build
mosques. As explained below, the ritual adhan calling Muslims to prayer, preferably in
mosques, is a long-standing practice that formally started in Cape Town in 1798, and is a
tradition that continues to the present day in other provinces like KwaZulu-Natal (where
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Muslims arrived in the nineteenth century and where the first mosque, the Juma Masjid
(also known as the Grey Street Mosque), was built in 188423)) and Gauteng (where the
first mosque, the Jumah Mosque (also known as the Kerk Street Mosque) was built in
Johannesburg in 188824)) and where Muslims also reside in large numbers.
Muslims constitute a minority in a predominantly Christian South Africa. The current
(2020) mid-year population of South Africa is 59.6 million.25 Based on the 2015 statistics,
Christians were estimated to constitute 86% of the total population. While Jews were
estimated to only constitute 0.2%, Muslims were estimated to constitute 1.9% (or roughly 1
million) of the total population making them the largest religious minority group at the
time.26 The majority of South African Muslims are Sunni and mostly followers of the
Hanafi and Shafi’i schools of law. The figures indicate that there are currently more Hindus
(3.3%) than Muslims (2.2%) in KwaZulu-Natal and that the largest number of Muslims are
located in the Western Cape (5.3%), followed by Gauteng (2.4%) and then KwaZulu-Natal
(2.2%).27
There are some 194 mosques in the Western Cape, followed by 78 in KwaZulu-Natal
and 19 in Gauteng.28
The first, though not the oldest, mosque in Cape Town to install a loudspeaker was the
Zeenatul Islam Mosque (also known as the Muir Street Mosque) in 1966. This was followed
by other mosques in the area and, lastly, by mosques in the Bo-Kaap.29 The Bo-Kaap
achieved heritage status in 2019, along with a prayer quarry and six (of eleven) mosques in
the area30. It is argued that the amplified adhan in these and surrounding areas must also
be viewed in its historical context. During apartheid the then government of South Africa
had promulgated the Group Areas Act No.41 of 1950 specifically to assign racial groups to
different residential areas. While Muslims, in a pre-Group Areas Act and pre-apartheid era,
lived in multi-religious and religiously tolerant communities in areas like District Six, for
example, today loudspeakers are used in remnants of these communities (some families
have recently repatriated back to the District Six area after a restitution process).
In terms of the historical context, the first weekly Friday congregational prayer
(jumu’a) was read in a disused stone quarry in Chiappini Street in Cape Town in 1793.31
The Qur’an (62:9) highlights that the jumu’a prayer is preceded by an adhan. This implies
that the first unamplified adhan was rendered from this site already prior to 1804 when
religious freedom was formally granted. The Auwal Mosque32 in the Bo-Kaap, the first
mosque established in the Cape in 1798 and the oldest mosque in South Africa, was also the
first mosque to conduct public prayers. Religious freedom was permitted from 1804. Hence
its establishment “came at a crucial period in the history of the Cape Muslim community”33
and remains symbolic of the recognition of Islam and of the freedom of slaves to worship.
Since its establishment, the call to prayer has been rendered for 223 years in South Africa.
Thereafter, the proliferation of mosques spread throughout the country.
Since Bo-Kaap and six of its mosques now have protected heritage status, some of
its residents are also arguing that the adhan must be part of the city’s “living heritage”.34
I contend that the National Heritage Resources Act No.25 of 1999, given the support for
cultural heritage in its provisions, may be a further potential instrument in terms of which
the ritual rendering of the adhan can be protected. I briefly explore the possibility of “living
heritage” in Section 4, and whether the constitutional right to culture could be invoked in
support of such an argument in Section 5.
3. Mr. Ellaurie’s Complaints to the Ethekwini Municipality, the SAHRC and the High
Court in Clarifying Context
It becomes evident from the SAHRC Report35, the facts of the case36 and Mr. Ellaurie’s
Founding Affidavit37 (in support of his application), that the conflict with the sounding of
the adhan, which started when the complaint was first lodged in 2003 with the EThekwini
Municipality, was long-standing. After a meeting with the Municipality and interested
parties held on 15 December 2003 led to an inconclusive outcome, Mr. Ellaurie reported
the matter to the SAHRC on 28 July 2004. As is evident from its report, the SAHRC duly
conducted mediation on 1 March 200538 and made several recommendations39 as far as
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both the Isipingo Beach Mosque and the Madrassa and its mosque were concerned. Mr.
Ellaurie decided to remove himself from the process and opted not to sign the report.
Given that these were merely recommendations that do not have the same binding and
legal effect as a court interdict, Mr. Ellaurie was well within his rights to bring the same
complaint to a different forum (the High Court) for further redress and relief. In 2020, some
16 years after the SAHRC mediation process was concluded in 2004, Mr. Ellaurie decided
to approach the High Court. The passage of time between the SAHRC and High Court
processes is an indication that Mr. Ellaurie’s grievances remained unresolved and ongoing.
The complaint to the SAHRC was directed at the adhans emanating from two mosques.
First, there is the Isipingo Beach Mosque administered by the Isipingo Beach Muslim
Association. This is a larger mosque utilized by the community in the area. As confirmed
in the case,40 it is a separate mosque from that belonging to the Madrassa. According
to Mr. Ellaurie it is situated some 200 metres41 from his property. Secondly, there is the
mosque belonging to the Madrassa itself which is located nearer to Mr. Ellaurie’s home.
The Madrassa is situated some 20 m (literally two doors away) from Mr. Ellaurie’s property,
with another dwelling between the two properties.42 While the case simply refers to
the Madrassa as an “Islamic institution” or as a “school for Islamic religious studies”43,
on its website44 the Madrassa Taleemuddeen refers to itself as a “university”. As such
its vast property consisting of three (numbers 703–705) lots or plots, includes a mosque
and “a teaching institution for Islamic religious studies with about 340 students . . . and
accommodation for staff and students”.45 The Madrassa’s mosque, therefore, serves the
needs of its program and of its staff and students, some of whom reside on the property.
This would also explain why the Madrassa does not broadcast the adhan through radio or
television (as indicated in Para. 15 of the judgment).
This article is primarily concerned with the Madrassa, because Mr. Ellaurie (the appli-
cant) sought an order interdicting only the Madrassa (first respondent) “from emanating
calls to Prayer [adhans] that can be heard beyond the boundaries of its property in Isipingo
Beach”.46 The Court granted the interdict and ordered the Madrassa “to ensure that Calls
to Prayer made from its property, to wit, Lots 703, 704 and 705 lsipingo Beach, are not
audible within the buildings in the applicant’s property at . . . , lsipingo Beach, Durban”.47
This confirms that the adhan, whether emanating from the Madrassa or its mosque, must
not be audible within Mr. Ellaurie’s house (dwelling) only and excludes the areas outside
of it. Ironically, it is the Isipingo Beach Mosque that utilizes an “external sound amplifier
system”48 whilst the Madrassa’s mosque, although it also has such a system, does not
utilize it. It is evident in the SAHRC’s reported recommendations (which are repeated in
the judgment) that the Madrassa’s mosque was advised not to use it and from the judgment
itself (Para. 15) that it did not intend to do so in the future. The recommendation reads:
“That the siren attached to Madrasah Taleemudeem [which we understand is meant
to assist with its operation] to remain [in] its location within the building. That whilst the
amplifier system at the [community] mosque being operated by the lsipingo Beach Muslim
Association is operational, the Madrasah Teleemudem would not use its facilities to call
people to prayer through the sound [a]mplifier outside the mosque.”49
It appears that the representative of the Madrassa at the time of the mediation
(Moulana M.I Patel) “ . . . found the recommendation reasonable and supported it”.50
As recorded in the SAHRC reported recommendations, the mediators then were a
commissioner from the SAHRC and a commissioner from the Promotion and Protection of
the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (hereafter, the CRL Rights
Commission).51
According to the facts of the case52, the introduction in his Heads of Argument53 and
his Founding Affidavit54, Mr. Ellaurie currently resides in Isipingo Beach in a property
obtained by his family over fifty years ago and that he now owns.
Isipingo, a formerly white area, was declared an Indian area in 1960 in terms of the
Group Areas Act.55 According to the facts of the case Mr. Ellaurie’s family moved to
lsipingo Beach in 1966 whilst the Madrassa only acquired its property, some 33 years later,
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in 1999.56 Given that there would be churches but not any mosques in that formerly white
area, mosques would therefore have to be constructed by the Muslim community to serve
their needs. Both mosques were, therefore, only built in the Isipingo Beach area after Mr.
Ellaurie’s family moved there: the Madrassa’s mosque in 1999 or 2000 (now some 21 years
old) and the Isipingo Beach Mosque in 1970 (now some 51 years old), four years after his
family moved in.
The Madrassa’s mosque had only been in operation for some three years at the time
Mr. Ellaurie first lodged complaints with the Municipality against both mosques in 2003,
while the community Isipingo mosque had already been in operation for some 33 years.
Mr. Ellaurie, having lived in the area, therefore had to have been aware of the adhan and
its sounding.
Although it is not clear from the SAHRC Report and the Ellaurie case whether or
not the Isipingo Beach Mosque may at that stage have been “formally” in compliance
with municipal regulations, Mr. Ellaurie chose to target only the Madrassa (even though
its adhan was unamplified). However, if Mr. Ellaurie had included the Isipingo Beach
Mosque, and its amplified adhan was found not to be compliant with the noise regulations
of the applicable by-laws, it would certainly have made for a stronger legal case and more
credible precedent.
The current religious leader at the Madrassa, Mufti E. Muhamad, who did not par-
ticipate in the mediation process, provided the author with further clarity as follows. He
confirmed in a personal communication (see Muhamad 2020) that the five daily, but unam-
plified, adhans are rendered from the mosque on the Madrassa’s premises. He explained
that the adhan is rendered from an area which, although it still forms part of the mosque,
is located one step outside of the building where the shoes of the worshippers or mosque
attendees (musallis) are kept. While the adhans are all unamplified, and usually rendered
in a moderate tone, this cannot always be controlled. Given the nature of the operations of
the Madrassa, where courses57 are offered to students of mixed race on both a full-time
and part-time basis and include the training to become imams of mosques and ulama (reli-
gious leaders), rather than dedicated persons who render the adhan (muezzins), different
persons (mostly students), whose voices may differ in volume, render the adhans and this
may sometimes result in an increase in their volume. Mr. Ellaurie58 subsequently also
provided the author with further clarity about his views and the outcome of the case. Mr.
Ellaurie’s Heads of Argument includes a video clip59 of an unamplified adhan rendered
from the Madrassa which Mr. Ellaurie had taken from his property after sunset. While the
reader is able to view the video and make his or her own assessment, the author, having
listened to it, contends that its volume would certainly appear to sound magnified (almost
amplified) to someone living in such close proximity to the Madrassa as Mr. Ellaurie did.
In the background one can also hear a second adhan being rendered (probably from the
Isipingo Beach Mosque) which reinforces the argument (in Section 5 (iii)(d) and Section 6)
of clashing of sounds when adhans are not synchronized.
Mr. Ellaurie conducted his own defence60 and the presiding Judge made it clear that
Mr. Ellaurie was acting on his own behalf and not in the public interest.61 Mr. Ellaurie
contended that the Madrassa has turned “a [once] diverse, peaceful residential suburb”
into “a Muslim enclave”.62
Mr. Ellaurie sought “an order, firstly, interdicting the [Madrassa] from emanating
Calls to Prayer that can be heard beyond the boundaries of its property in lsipingo Beach.
Secondly, that the [Madrassa] ceases its operations in the area, and its property in the area
be sold to the State or to a non-Muslim entity”.63
The Judge ordered that the Madrassa’s volume be toned down and denied the order
for the Madrassa to be shut down.64 Since Mr. Ellaurie’s request for the “banning of the
Madrasah from the area”65 was not entertained, the focus of this article is on the first order.
The Municipality (second respondent) was represented in the SAHRC mediation
process but did not participate in the Ellaurie case. The eThekwini Municipality “Nuisances
and Behavior in Public Places By-law, 2015”66 was published on 11 September 2015 and is
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up to date as at 7 August 2020. Section 8 (1) of the by-law prohibits an unauthorized noise
that impairs the convenience or peace of any person as follows:
“No person may in a public place cause or permit to be caused any disturbance or
impairment of the convenience or peace of any person by shouting, screaming or
making any other loud or persistent noise or sound, including amplified noise or
sound, except where such noise or sound is emanating from—(a) an authorised
public meeting, gathering, congregation or event” (emphasis added).
The by-law therefore clearly includes within its ambit both unamplified and amplified
adhans. In fact, a public law expert points out that “[e]ven a noise that has strictly speaking
passed the scientific test required for a noise disturbance might still be considered a noise
nuisance if found to be unreasonable”.67 Mr. Ellaurie provided video evidence to highlight
the effect of the noise nuisance on him. However, “[t]he Municipality did not participate in
the litigation”.68 The volume of the adhan (“noise nuisance”) was, therefore, not established
to be in contravention of the municipal noise control regulations.
4. Municipal Complaints Directed against the Adhan in Cape Town and Gauteng Prior
to and Since the Ellaurie Case
In December 2018, several complaints by a single individual were lodged against the
adhan emanating from a mosque (Masjidus Saligeen) located in Strandfontein, a coastal
settlement within the jurisdiction of the City of Cape Town Municipality. It is reported in
the media that:
“Following meetings with the City and the [Cape-based Muslim Judicial Council]
MJC [founded in 1945], it was agreed that the athaan would not be silenced. The
entire saga upset Muslims and Christian residents, with thousands signing a
petition to apply pressure on the city council.”69
A few months later, in May 2020, and a few months before the outcome of the Ellaurie
case in August 2020, the rendering of the adhan at the Zeenatul Islam Mosque in District
Six also became a contentious issue after a single complaint was lodged with the City of
Cape Town by a person living in a nearby flat.70 While the City was obliged, in terms of its
municipal noise by-laws, to investigate the complaint,71 the City had, as a consequence,
apparently gone a step further and “publicly announc[ed] it would amend its noise by-law
to exempt religious activity”.72
According to a statement released by the Office of the Secretary General of the MJC73,
the MJC had participated in a meeting called by the City of Cape Town on 30 April 2020 after
concerns were raised of an alleged intent by the City of Cape Town to amend its existing
“Streets, Public Places and the Prevention of Noise Nuisances By-law, 2007”74, notably
section 3 dealing with “noise nuisance”, which the MJC (and the Muslim community)
understood would negatively impact the sounding of the five daily adhans.
Section 3 provides as follows: “No person shall in a public place—(a) cause or permit
to be caused a disturbance by shouting, screaming or making any other loud or persistent
noise or sound, including amplified noise or sound; or (b) permit noise from a private
residence or business to be audible in a public place, except for the purposes of loud-
speaker announcements for public meetings or due to the actions of street entertainers”
(emphasis added).
The City representatives acknowledged that the by-law was in the process of being
updated and apparently assured the MJC that its (singular) proposed change to the by-law
was unrelated to places of worship, and therefore, would not have an impact on the adhan.
The City did, however, indicate that the rest of the by-law
“will be subjected to further review later [in 2020] or early [in 2021], which will
allow for additional amendments, which could also apply to the exemption of
places of worship from the current noise nuisance provisions”.
The above by-law was opened for public comment in May, 2020. Although many
comments were received, no amendments have as yet been approved.75
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The Cape Town by-laws were deemed “insensitive” and are currently under review.
In 1966, some 54 years ago, the then apartheid government declared District Six a “whites
only” area in terms of the Group Areas Act No.41 of 1950. As a consequence, many Muslim
families were among the thousands of residents who were slowly, but forcibly, removed
from District Six to other more remote areas over a period of some ten years.76 Muslims
had no option but to relocate from areas where they had painstakingly raised private
funding for, and established, mosques which as endowed (“waqf” in Arabic) property,
were fortunately not demolished. They had to start the process from scratch in the areas to
which they were subsequently relocated. One such mosque located in District Six is the
Zeenatul Islam Mosque in Muir Street established in 1920 by early Muslim settlers from
India. This mosque was 100 years old in 2020. Given its age, a cogent case could be made
also for it to be declared a heritage site. However, according to a trustee of the mosque, the
Muir Street mosque has not applied for such status.77 There is an ongoing call for the area
to be declared a national heritage site.
A third general complaint is highlighted in a Public Announcement dated 22 August
2020, where the Imam of the Nural Huda mosque in the Bo-Kaap (est. 1958 and declared a
heritage site since 2019), alerted the community that on 21 August 2020 (the same day that
the judgment in the Ellaurie case was delivered) a complaint had been lodged against the
adhan emanating from the mosque and was being investigated. This was the second such
complaint directed at this mosque. It is reported that the complainant (like Mr. Ellaurie)
had “found the noise disturbing”78. A fourth general complaint (although the third in
Bo-Kaap) pertaining to a different mosque in the area (deemed to be the Jamia Masjid
(est.1850 and a heritage site since 2019) was also lodged around the same time. Unlike Mr.
Ellaurie, the complainants (assuming there was more than one) against the adhan in the
Bo-Kaap have not been identified, nor were official notices (summonses) or fines issued.
The City of Cape Town law enforcement officers simply paid the respective mosques a
formal visit to inform the imams of the complaints against the sounding of the adhan. The
three complaints were apparently the first such complaints in the history of the Bo-Kaap
and were received in quick succession (within a period of two months).
Falling back on a traditional defence, the Imam indicates that the Nural Huda Mosque
in Bo-Kaap was “ . . . the first mosque [in that area] to have sounded the Athaan over a
speaker more than 50 years ago. Those making these complaints expect us to discontinue
something we have been doing for many years . . . ”79
It has also been reported that residents believe that “people’s lack of knowledge about
Bo-Kaap’s long history of mosque practices” has led to these complaints being unfairly
lodged, and that “[t]hey should know when they buy properties here that the Athaan is
part of the package, with all our other customs and practices”.80 The chairperson of the Bo-
Kaap Civic and Ratepayers Association was of the opinion that it needed to be ascertained
whether the complaint was due to “intolerance” or “ignorance” since their investigation
found that “ . . . people moving into the area hear the athaan and claim ignorance that they
didn’t know. People are using this to settle personal scores as we see with the Isipingo case
. . . ”81 However, this argument may not exempt mosques from complying with nuisance
by-laws as the reverse case scenario can also apply.
It appears that the adhan, even if religious activity is to be exempted from the ambit
of the City of Cape Town’s municipal noise and nuisance by-laws, will not exempted from
being deemed a noise nuisance in terms of the City’s by-laws because people already lived
there or because people moved into the area subsequently.
If mosques, whether located in residential or business areas, adhere to noise nuisance
by-laws, neighbors would not feel compelled to lodge municipal complaints or to move
from areas in which they have lived for years (in some cases even before mosques were
built). By the same token, while consideration is given to location, businesses or people
working there, new or foreign home buyers or businesses should not be deterred from
moving into an area simply because of the existence of mosques. However, when persons
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opt to live in such areas, or to establish businesses there, it would be considered reasonable
to expect them to tolerate some noise from religious symbols, and regardless of their nature.
The City’s executive director for safety and security in another report indicated that
although the adhan complaint was “a very technical matter”, it did lend itself to “an
amicable solution”. Further, that “enforcing the city’s bylaws was a balancing act between
the rights to practi[s]e religion and the rights of residents. “If it is proved that the decibel
reading is higher than what is permissible in that area, environmental health staff will
contact both parties to find an amicable solution. Sometimes the volume needs to be turned
down slightly or the speaker needs to be turned in a different direction. The City’s view is
that the rights of both parties must be respected”.82
In approaching the various mosques with complaints, the City of Cape Town was
relying on a by-law that is in the process of being amended. Although the complaints
against the Bo-Kaap mosques were unprecedented, it can be inferred from the above views
expressed by the City’s executive director that it is highly unlikely that any proposed
amendments to the by-law will exempt the unlawful rendering of an amplified adhan from
its ambit. It is contended that the adhan, although of religious origin, is nonetheless only a
Sunna (tradition) and even if it is to be considered part of a “living” or “lived” heritage, as
is now being called for, it would not be able to enjoy complete legal immunity regardless
of whether its sounding is amplified or unamplified. Although Muslims may still appear
to be concentrated83 in certain parts of the Bo-Kaap, it is not an exclusively Muslim area.
The Bo-Kaap is a mixed area where Muslims and Christians live side by side.
It might, however, be cogently argued that it might be an appropriate historical
heritage in that the adhan is disseminated by human voice from mosques in areas where
Muslims form a majority (as in certain parts of the Bo-Kaap), as it serves the majority. The
role of the size of a community (minority or majority) and its impact on the adhan is further
explored in the criterion of reasonableness under Section 5 (iii)(b).
On 28 August 2020, barely a week after the outcome of the Ellaurie case, City of
Tshwane authorities in the capital city, Pretoria, (in Gauteng Province), following several
complaints received from residents, ordered the Raslouw Jamaat Khana, a mosque located
in Centurion, Pretoria, to reduce the volume of its broadcasting of the adhan through
loudspeakers.84
The mosque was served with a notice and ordered by the City of Tshwane’s health
department to also reduce, with immediate effect, the volume of the sounding of its call to
prayer, failing which legal action would be taken.85 The notice detailed that the mosque
should not “operate, play or allow to be operated or played a radio, television set, drum
musical instrument, sound amplifier, loudspeaker system, or a similar device producing,
reproducing or amplifying sound so as to cause a noise nuisance”.86
As is also evident from the notice, it appears that the City of Tshwane has developed a
unique, “first of its kind in . . . South Africa”, Noise Management System87 based on its
Noise Management Policy88. This system (and its procedures—starting with an investiga-
tion as a first step and legal action resorted to only as a last measure) provides a good model
for other municipalities on how to efficiently handle noise nuisance complaints emanating
from religious symbols like the adhan. In three of the four general complaints recounted
above, reference is made to media reporting of community responses. In Section 5 (iii)(b)
it will be highlighted that, although community opinion is an important determinant in
the criterion of reasonableness, such comment may not necessarily be representative of
general/predominant community views.
Legal and practical issues of sounding the adhan in a diverse, Muslim-minority
context need not be controversial. In some cities of the USA allowances are being made
for amplified adhans to be broadcast to the outside. In an example of what in 2004 was
construed to be an exception to the national norm for Muslim minorities in the USA, a city
council effectively granted a religious exemption from the city’s noise ordinances.89
In The Netherlands, although amplified adhans have been legally authorised since the
1980s, municipalities are able to restrict unreasonable use of amplification.90 Ironically, it
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appears that after initially being banned by Dutch colonisers, support for formal recognition
of amplified (and by implication unamplified) adhans in the City of Cape Town can be
found in the current and unique Dutch example.
5. An Analysis of Competing Constitutional Rights to Religious Freedom and
Property in the Context of the Ellaurie Case
The South African Constitution (1996) is the supreme law in South Africa. Since
apartheid only ended in 1994, the main aim of the Constitution is to avoid the injustices of
the past. The Preamble to the Constitution, although it has little legal value, encourages the
South African people to be “united” in their “diversity”. Section 15 (1) (freedom of religion,
belief and opinion) of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of religion to all
South Africans and provides as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience,
religion, thought, belief and opinion.” Although section 15 is narrowly constructed and
makes no formal reference to manifestation, the apex court has interpreted the right to
religious freedom to include the right to manifest and practice such beliefs. However, the
fundamental rights protected in its Bill of Rights, including freedom of religion, are not
absolute and may be limited in terms of section 36 (1) of the Constitution to promote the
public interest or to protect other human rights like property (section 25), for example.
Section 36 (1) (limitation clause) contains specific criteria according to which a limitation
must be justified.91 Although section 36 (1) uses the phrase “reasonable and justifiable”
rather than the terms “balancing” or “proportionality”92, the Judge, in his reasoning and
ruling in the Ellaurie case, was criticized by the Madrassa for failing to weigh up and
balance competing rights to religious freedom and property (which includes neighbor
law and noise nuisance) and case law pertaining thereto. To test whether this criticism is
justified, and whether therefore the Madrassa’s appeal may yet meet with success, this
section provides an analysis of freedom of religion and property clauses in the Constitution
and the common law pertaining to neighbors (noise nuisance) and case law pertaining
thereto in the context of the Ellaurie case. Section 39 (2)93 (interpretation clause) of the final
Constitution encourages us to strive for the achievement of an effective and meaningful
development of the common law. This implies an engagement with nuisance law (private
law) within the ambit of human rights law (public law). As such, it is divided into three
Sub-sections, with some overlap because property law straddles private and public law,
as follows: (i) freedom of religion and its manifestation and limitation; (ii) the right to
property (neighbor law and noise nuisance); and (iii) the criterion of reasonableness and its
four main principles:
(i) Freedom of religion and its manifestation and limitation
The adhan as a religious symbol is an expression of the manifestation of religion.
Section 31 (cultural, religious and linguistic communities) deals with the protection of
minority rights. Section 15, read together with section 31, guarantees the right of a person
belonging to a religious community to enjoy and practice his or her religion with other
members of that community. Although the right to religious freedom is always guaranteed
and protected, its manifestation may be limited under section 36 if it conflicts with other
rights, such as, property (section 25), privacy (section 14), expression (section 16) and
environment (section 24), for example, which are also protected. However, even if restricted,
some sort of balance has to be sought between the conflicting rights. I contend that since
such a balancing of rights did not occur in the Ellaurie case, that therefore, the Madrassa
was not treated equally or fairly (section 9). Section 9 (3) provides:
“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone
on one or more grounds, including . . . religion, conscience, belief, culture [and]
language . . . .”
The Judge gave little, if any, consideration to the rights of the students and staff who
were exercising their right to religious freedom and the manifestation thereof through the
adhan (a ritual and religious symbol) rendered from the mosque on the property of the
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Madrassa and, moreover, failed to conduct a limitation analysis according to the criteria
identified in section 36 and interpretive guidelines provided in international law.
I provide the following, often overlapping, further explanation and analysis in support
of my contentions.
The Bill of Rights of both the interim94 (section 14) and final (section 15) Constitutions
contain provisions relating to freedom of religion. However, the interim Constitution did
not contain the equivalent of section 31 (1) of the final Constitution. There are Constitutional
Court cases in South Africa dealing with both the interim and final Constitutions confirming
that “manifestation” is included within the ambit of freedom of religion. In Lawrence95,
the first case dealing with the right to religious freedom heard by the Constitutional Court
(though in the context of section 14 of the interim Constitution which was then still in
force), the court (per Chaskalson P) adopted the Supreme Court of Canada’s96 definition of
freedom of religion:
“The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such
religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly
and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious
belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.”
In a separate judgment O’ Regan J argued (at Para. 128) that in her view,
“the requirements of the Constitution require . . . that the legislature refrain from
favouring one religion over others. Fairness and even-handedness in relation to
diverse religions is a necessary component of freedom of religion.”
While the interpretations of section 14 of the interim Constitution remain relevant to section
15, based on the values of the final Constitution of equality, freedom and human dignity,
and as confirmed in several subsequent court cases referred to in this Sub-section (Pillay,
Prince etc.), all religions, beliefs and ideologies are seen as equal in terms of, and protected
under, section 15. This implies that the adhan, as a religious symbol, ought not to be subject
to different treatment simply because its oral (declamatory) nature may be different from
the aural nature of, for example, Christian, Jewish and Hindu religious symbols.
The foundation of a range of individual human rights contained in the Constitution
were sourced from international human rights instruments. In 1998 (after the Lawrence case)
South Africa ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of
1966.97 In terms of section 39 (1)(b) (interpretation clause) and sections 231 to 233 (providing
for international law) of the Constitution, courts are obliged to apply the provisions of
the ICCPR. The Judge in the Ellaurie case (Para. 11), although relying only on the earlier
Lawrence case, correctly interprets the freedom of religion clause of the Constitution to
include the manifestation thereof. However, the Judge appears to contradict himself by
stating in Para. 16 that while section 15 (1) of the Constitution guarantees everyone the
right to religious freedom, “ . . . it does not guarantee practice or manifestations of religion. The
Call to Prayer, is a manifestation of the Islam religion, it is not Islam itself” (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, in so doing, the Judge also confuses the integral role of the adhan in Islam
and fails to draw a distinction between the status of the unamplified and amplified adhan
in Islam.
Although more relevant, but not referred to in the Ellaurie case, the Christian Education98
case is a later Constitutional Court case which can be cited in support of section 15 of the
final Constitution being interpreted as including the manifestation of religion. Moreover,
the Christian case included the right to freedom of religion under sections 15 (1) and 31
(1)(a) of the final Constitution. At Para. 18, Sachs J expresses his approval of the Canadian
Supreme Court’s definition as quoted by Chaskalson P in the Lawrence case above: “I
cannot offer a better definition than this of the main attributes of freedom of religion.” The
Prince case99 is another such later Constitutional Court case which deals with manifestation
of religion:
“This Court has on two occasions [Lawrence and Christian cases] considered the
contents of the right to freedom of religion . . . On each occasion, it has accepted
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that the right to freedom of religion at least comprehends . . . (c) the right to
manifest such beliefs by worship and practice, teaching and dissemination . . .
Seen in this context, sections 15 (1) and 31 (1)(a) complement one another . . . In
the context of religion [section 31 (1)(a)] emphasizes the protection to be given to
members of communities united by religion to practi[s]e their religion”. Although
the Judge in the Ellaurie100 case does refer to the Prince case, unfortunately it is
in the context of doctrinal entanglement (detailed below) and not manifestation
of religion.
Articles 18 (1) and (3) of the ICCPR, respectively, go further than section 15 (which
does not formally include manifestation) and include both the manifestation (“to manifest
his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching”) and limitation (“limi-
tations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”) of religious freedom.
The “Siracusa Principles”101 is an international guideline published by the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights on how these grounds of limitation should be interpreted in the
ICCPR. It makes allowances for States to limit and derogate from certain rights contained
in the ICCPR, provides specific conditions on the limitation of rights and contains several
general interpretative principles about limitation clauses. For example, it requires States
to ensure that a limitation is “prescribed by law”, must “pursue a legitimate aim” and is
necessary “in a democratic society”.
Section 36 (1) of the Constitution (limitation of rights) provides and lists certain criteria
as follows:
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,
taking into account all relevant factors including—(a) the nature of the right; (b)
the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the
limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less
restrictive means to achieve the purpose.”
In terms of both the ICCPR and South African constitutional case law, freedom of
religion includes the manifestation thereof. The Madrassa (also described in the case as
a “school for Islamic religious studies”102) by rendering of the adhan (religious symbol)
was giving effect to a manifestation of religious freedom. The adhan is accommodated in a
plural South Africa and not banned. Although Judge Mgnadi did not refer to the Pillay
case in which the Constitutional Court103 stated that if a practice is integral and important
for a person or religion it should be respected, he does nonetheless acknowledge the adhan
as a manifestation of Islam.
Article 18 (2) of the ICCPR provides that “[n]o one shall be subject to coercion which
would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”. Although
always protected, religious freedom per se is not absolute and parts of it can be limited.
While the forum externum—external manifestation—can be limited under Article 18 (3),
the forum internum cannot be limited and is absolute. The manifestation of religious
freedom may be limited in terms of the specific criteria detailed in section 36 above. Mr.
Ellaurie, in his Founding Affidavit (Para. 81) called upon the court to apply the limitation
clause “to stop the Call to Prayer from mosques into the surrounding neighborhood”.
In doing so, he was seeking to limit the Madrassa’s manifestation of its religion and not
its religious freedom to do so. In order to answer the question as to whether the adhan
(manifestation of faith) can be limited in the instances of the Ellaurie case, the limitation
clause (section 36) gives rise to a two-stage enquiry. In Director of Public Prosecutions,
Transvaal104, the Constitutional Court, in the judgment of Ngcobo J, described this two-
pronged inquiry as follows:
“The question of whether a right in the Bill of Rights has been violated generally
involves a two-pronged enquiry. The first enquiry is whether the invalidated
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provision limits a right in the Bill of Rights. If the provision limits a right in
the Bill of Rights, this right must be clearly identified. The second enquiry is
whether the limitation is reasonable and justifiable (under section 36 1) of the
Constitution . . . Courts considering the constitutionality of a statutory provision
should therefore adhere to this approach to constitutional adjudication.”
Both stages, thus, “themselves encompass a number of enquiries.”105 It needs to be
ascertained whether the limitation was “prescribed by law” and “necessary”. The Consti-
tution affords municipal by-laws the same legal status as other national and provincial
legislation. Although the Madrassa’s adhan was unamplified, the municipal by-law in
question included unamplified adhans within its ambit. However, the Madrassa was or-
dered to tone down the volume of its adhan without it being established that its sounding
contravened the by-law. The order may therefore have been unnecessarily drastic especially
since the Madrassa gave the assurance that it would not use amplification and since other
“less restrictive” measures (to be detailed in Section 6) could have been considered which
would also have resulted in a reduction in volume.
A brief engagement with the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 22106,
highlights that there may yet be scope in the limitation clause of the ICCPR to justify a
limitation or reduction of the sound levels of adhans. Renteln107 explains that since the
exceptions in Article 18 (3) effectively imply a reduction in the scope of the right to religious
freedom,
“[t]o provide direction, the Human Rights Committee issued General Comment
22 giving an interpretation of Article 18. It interprets practice as covering a ‘broad
range of acts’; [including] . . . ’the right to build places of worship’. Furthermore
. . . that the restrictions may not be applied in a discriminatory manner. Although
there is no reference to religious sounds per se . . . With regard to the call to
prayer, regulation may be justifiable if it is deemed incompatible with public
morals or public health. Some might argue that the frequency of the calls deserves
consideration . . . evidence regarding the health effects of the call to prayer is
non-existent or inconclusive; it is hard to separate the noise levels it produces
from general measures of community noise. Yet there are, most assuredly, ad-
verse physical and psychological consequences for those who find the sounds
objectionable. Should there be a determination that the decibel level regularly
exceeds internationally agreed-upon standards . . . then that might provide a
basis for limiting the call to prayer . . . In international law, the limitations clause
might provide a rationale for a limitation on sound level. There is some basis for
religious exemptions in the international jurisprudence. Whether states would
make exception in the case of nuisance or noise pollution for the loud sounds of religious
minorities remains to be determined” (emphasis added).
In the first motion of his Founding Affidavit, Mr. Ellaurie calls for the cessation of
the Madrassa’s broadcasting of the adhan “with or without amplification”. Although the
basis of his High Court case was the actual volume of the adhan, it appears that his main
motivation may have been the silencing (not reducing the volume) of the adhan, whether
amplified or not. I, therefore, contend that Mr. Ellaurie, given the implications that the
wording of the adhan, as both a summation and declaration of the principal tenets of the
Islamic faith, may hold for his Hindu faith, may also have found its wording offensive.
Mr. Ellaurie has indicated in his Founding Affidavit that the 16-year period between
the mediation process and his approaching the courts had afforded him the opportunity to
study Islam. I quote the following extracts contained in it on Islam and on the adhan in
which he states that:
“It . . . allow[ed] him the opportunity to study the Muslim religion and what he found
was deeply troubling . . . In [his] opinion . . . there is only one God, the creator of
the universe . . . [but that he] . . . is firmly of the opinion that Muhammad was
not a Messenger of God and therefore finds objectionable the following line from the
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Muslim Call to Prayer that is broadcast from mosques: ‘I bear witness that the Prophet
of the Muslim religion is the Messenger of God’. Allowing a continuation of the
Call to Prayer means that our country is giving the nod to racism and bigotry”
(emphasis added).108
According to the Judge (Para. 17) “[u]nfortunately, the applicant finds the Call to Prayer
particularly offensive due to his views towards Islam” (emphasis added).
This is a clear indication that he was offended by some of the wording of the adhan
in addition to its sounding. The wording of the first part of the adhan as a manifestation
of one (first of several) of the articles of faith in Islam, namely, belief in the existence of
one God, would not have been problematic to Mr. Ellaurie because he was also of the
opinion that “there is only one God”. However, he did have a problem with the second
part of the adhan pertaining to the Prophet Muhammad (which forms part of the basic
statement of the Islamic faith). It can, therefore, be argued that the implied meaning of the
Islamic confession of faith, and therefore the adhan, could be offensive for non-Muslims
like Mr. Ellaurie.
In Schirrmacher’s opinion109, “the muezzin, in making a verbal confession of faith,
compels other people to participate in the exercise of another religion five times a day.
As a result, this . . . touches upon the concept of negative religious freedom”. Given the
uniqueness of the adhan and the difference between it and other religious symbols, his is a
view that I am inclined to agree with. One can therefore argue that the adhan should not
only be examined at the level of noise disturbance but also whether it could infringe upon
negative religious freedom by the incessant confessional statement imposed on involuntary
and coerced listeners like Mr. Ellaurie.
Although I refer below to an Indian High Court case (Moulana Mufti Syed) which
deemed that it could, Renteln110 effectively rationalizes away a possible argument that the
wording of the adhan may be restricted on the basis of section 16 (Freedom of expression)
of the South African Constitution:
“One might consider the possibility that the adhan is a question of religious
speech. If laws regulate it on the basis of its content, this would clearly constitute
an impingement on freedom of speech. However, mandating a lower decibel
limit might well be acceptable under time, place, and manner restrictions.”
The adhan is rendered and freely expressed in the Arabic language. Given that
prayer is an integral part of their faith, most local Muslims may be able to interpret and
understand the meaning of the wording of the adhan. However, while many are taught to
read and recite their prayers in Arabic, most do not understand Arabic per se. Nonetheless,
although Arabic is not one of the eleven official languages of South Africa, it can be inferred
that section 30 (language and culture) of the Constitution, read with sections 9 and 31,
both permit and protect the use of Arabic as a language, and that section 16 (freedom of
expression) guarantees religious speech.
The judgment contains a lengthy Paragraph [4] where the Judge describes what could
be construed as Mr. Ellaurie’s derogatory view of Islam (including being a religion that
promotes “cultural racism”). A few lines of this paragraph, containing the gist thereof, are
quoted:
“The applicant is Hindu and . . . unashamedly opposed to the Islamic faith, which
is propagated by the Madrasah. The applicant regards Islam as a false religion
that discriminates against non-Muslims as non-believers . . . The applicant holds
the view that Islam promotes cultural racism.”
The Constitution does not guarantee South Africans the right not to have their religious
beliefs or practices questioned or criticized. Regardless of any discomfort it may have
caused for the Madrassa, the guarantee contained in section 15 (1) (freedom of religion)
afforded Mr. Ellaurie the constitutional right to form, hold and express the opinions he did.
However, it appears that he may have gone too far in doing so. In Minister of Home Affairs
v Fourie111, another important case not referred to in the Ellaurie case, the Constitutional
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Court affirmed that “the rights of . . . minority faiths must be fully respected”. What is,
therefore, problematic, is that the Judge did not ask for the striking out of statements
against Islam nor did the judgment include the Madrassa’s response countering them.112
As a consequence of media reporting of community responses following the outcome of
the case, the stigmatizing label “Islamophobe”113 was imposed on Mr. Ellaurie. This was
an assertion which he denied and disputed and therefore also challenged with the Press
Council. However, Mr. Ellaurie technically lost this case.114
Although further along in Paragraph [4] the Judge includes Mr. Ellaurie’s aver-
ment that Islam as a religion falls outside the protective ambit of the South African
Constitution,115 the Judge does rectify that it does. The Judge also highlights the SCA
case (De Lange) which states that courts may not interfere or question doctrinal practices of
religions (“doctrine of entanglement”):
“A court should only become involved in a dispute of this kind where it is strictly
necessary for it to do so. Even then it should refrain from determining doctrinal
issues in order to avoid entanglement.”116
The mixed racial profile of the Madrassa refutes the view that “Islam promotes cultural
racism”. As far as the adhan is concerned, the very first person tasked with rendering the
adhan in Islam was a black man (Bilal ibn Rabah) accorded this role on merit (his resonant
and melodious voice). To date, the person who renders the adhan (muezzin) in a mosque in
Cape Town, where Islam was also first established, is still referred to as “bilal” in his honor.
The Judge correctly asserts that Courts have a disinclination to get involved with
doctrinal matters. The Judge also quotes Ngcobo J, who delivered the minority judgment
in the Constitutional Court case of Prince117, in support of such disinclination:
“Human beings may freely believe in what they cannot prove. Yet that their be-
liefs are bizarre, illogical or irrational to others, or are incapable of scientific proof,
does not detract from the fact that these are religious beliefs for the purposes
of enjoying the protection guaranteed by the right to freedom of religion. The
believers should not be put to the proof of their beliefs or faith.”
He highlights that courts would need to be guided by expert evidence to deal with
matters of doctrinal interpretation and that since there are other mosques in the area,
it would be futile to only ban the Madrassa.118 The Judge (in Para. 11) provides clear
reasoning for his position by saying that Islam is protected by the Constitution. However,
the question was not whether Islam is protected under section 15, but whether a very
specific manifestation of the faith (the adhan) can be limited in the very specific instances
of the Ellaurie case. Para. 11 is the only instance in the case where the Judge refers to
the limitation clause: “There is no law of general application envisaged in s 36 of the
Constitution, which outlaws Islam.” Unfortunately, Judge Mgnadi did not conduct a
limitation analysis and therefore it was not ascertained whether the High Court’s limitation
of the Madrassa’s manifestation (through the adhan) of the right to religious freedom
was justifiable.
South Africa can heed and take lessons from the Supreme Court (apex court and the
court of final appeal) cases dealing with amplified adhans in India (a Muslim minority
State) and Indonesia (a Muslim majority State), whence local Muslims originated. In both
countries, the human rendering of the adhan is unrestricted.
In India, the unamplified adhan thus far seems to have attracted little challenge
because of the acceptance by the courts of the integral role it plays in Islam and the lives
of Muslims living there. The use of loudspeakers is permitted in both countries, although
its unauthorised use may be restricted by measures in place to restrict its volume. Several
High Court and Supreme Court119 cases in India dealt with noise pollution justified on the
basis of religion. The Indian Supreme Court (in Church of God) has ruled that the adhan
rendered by human voice is protected by Article 25 (freedom of religion clause) of the
Indian Constitution (1949). However, it can be inferred from some of the cases, that, like
South Africa, the rights contained in Article 25 are not absolute and may be subject to
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restrictions (limitations) imposed by other provisions in the Constitution. Since Islam
does not prescribe voice amplification, it can also be inferred from the Supreme Court
judgment that when voice amplification is used, it must comply with rules regulating
noise pollution. The outcome of this decision, is therefore, that all religions in India must
comply with this ruling. It is interesting to note that, in comparison, in the USA120 and the
Netherlands121 the use of electronic devices such as megaphones and loudspeakers also
fall under constitutional protection.
Meiliana is a recent controversial Indonesian case involving the volume of the adhan
as a noise nuisance in the context of freedom of religion which proceeded all the way
to the Supreme Court. The objection by Ms Meiliana, a Chinese (Buddhist)–Indonesian
woman, to the noise nuisance caused by the loudspeakers was perceived as questioning
the “azan” as a religious symbol. As a consequence, she was charged in the District Court
with religious blasphemy because of her “hostility” towards Islam. The High Court upheld
the District Court’s decision and her appeal to the precedent-setting Supreme Court (which
upheld the High Court’s decision) was rejected.122 It appears from the final outcome of the
Meiliana case, that the Indonesian courts, in failing to take into consideration the distinction
between the status of amplified and unamplified adhans in Islam, may inadvertently be
sending out a message that it does not matter whether amplified adhans may be deemed
loud by non-Muslims, let alone Muslims (even if they are in the majority). In both India
and Indonesia objections to the silencing of amplified adhans often gave rise to communal
tension and riots. However, loudspeakers on churches and mosques can mediate religious
violence as was the case closer to home in Jos, Nigeria123, and in response to which citizens
developed “techniques of inattention”. Although these examples hold lessons for averting
such possible violence locally, ultimately, the sounding of the adhan should not be deterred
by agendas of nationalism.
(ii) The right to property (neighbor law and noise nuisance)124
This Sub-section will examine the outcome of the Ellaurie case in the context of property
law and the nuisance laws that form part of neighbor law. It appears that Judge Mngadi,
while elaborating on Mr. Ellaurie’s right to both the use and undisturbed enjoyment of his
private property125, failed to analyze the extent to which South African law guaranteed Mr.
Ellaurie such right.
An important function of property law in South Africa is to manage and harmonize
competing interests of property owners. As such, it does not bestow on property owners
“absolute and unlimited entitlements” and “various limitations exist in the interest of the
community and for the benefit of other people”.126 Pope and Du Plessis127 highlight that
“overarching criteria of reasonableness and fairness govern neighbor relations in property
law . . . To determine nuisance in each case, an objective reasonableness test is applied. The
enquiry is whether the conduct complained of is to be tolerated.”
A valid question is whether the unamplified adhan was found to be unreasonable in
terms of such a test and therefore to constitute a noise nuisance warranting an interdict?
Pope and Du Plessis128 explain that although the personality of the applicant (Mr. Ellaurie)
may be relevant, reasonableness applies to the activity complained of (in this case the
unamplified adhan), rather than to whether or not the neighbor (in this case the Madrassa)
was being reasonable, since it is the former that is the “test for delictual liability”.129 South
African law permits the regulation of objectionable sounds or “noise” if they cause a
disturbance. Was the noise, therefore, objectively measured (in decibels) with the use of
technical instruments and found to be unacceptable in terms of the by-law of the Ethekwini
Municipality? Or was it ascertained to be unacceptable based purely on Mr. Ellaurie’s
subjective evaluation (and possibly his video evidence)? Was there any attempt to weigh
up and strike a balance between the noise (of the Madrassa’s adhan) and the peace and
quiet (not “silence”) (sought by Mr. Ellaurie) to justify lowering its volume?
It appears that the Judge in the Ellaurie case, when he decided that the Madrassa must
reduce the volume of the sound of its unamplified adhans, basically not only ignored the
Madrassa’s right to practice religion, but also ignored neighbor law and relevant case law
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when he conferred on Mr. Ellaurie the right to undisturbed enjoyment of his property, and
therefore set a “poor precedent”. The Judge failed to follow precedent and as a consequence
also set a bad precedent.
The dispute in the Ellaurie case is not an uncommon one in South African neighbor
law. There are many examples of neighbor law disputes in reported cases, including
precedent setting cases. For example, the Western Cape case, Garden Cities Incorporated
Association Not For Gain v Northpine Islamic Society 1999 (2) SA 268 (C), although not binding
in KwaZulu-Natal, related directly to the adhan yet was not referred to in the Ellaurie case.
In Garden Cities, the applicant, as a result of complaints received from surrounding residents,
successfully sought an interdict against the noise nuisance caused by the respondent’s loud
sounding of an electronically amplified adhan. The applicant, however, had no objection to
an unamplified adhan being rendered by a human voice. The applicant had sold a property
designated for religious purposes to the respondent to be used to build a mosque. The
written agreement contained clauses which specifically prohibited the respondent from
utilising sound amplifying equipment (which included a loudspeaker) and that the adhan
would be signalled by using a light on top of the minaret of the mosque which would be
switched on at the appropriate times of prayer.130 Judge Conradie noted in his judgment in
Garden Cities that “[a]lthough there was evidence that it had become a widespread practice
for calls to prayer to be electronically amplified, there was nothing to suggest that such
amplification had become a precept of the Islamic religion after centuries of calls to prayer
without sound equipment”.131 In his comment on the case, Van der Schyff132 highlights
that although the agreement may have constituted a limitation (in terms of section 36) on
the right to religious freedom, it was reasonable because “ . . . the religious practice was
not forbidden but merely a particular form of its expression. The amplification of the call
to prayer had thus not been an essential element of Islam”.
In the Ellaurie case, the noise nuisance (unamplified adhan) was not found to be
unreasonable and therefore the interdict granted in favor of Mr. Ellaurie may not have
been justifiable. Furthermore, the Court granted the interdict on the ground of alleged
infringement of Mr. Ellaurie’s property rights without giving due consideration of how
the Madrassa’s right to freedom of religion and manifestation thereof (which includes the
rendering of the adhan) may limit his property rights. South African neighbor law expects
that neighbors (even if they are related as was the case with the Gien brothers detailed
below) living in urban areas would endure occasional, reasonable noise nuisances that
give rise to disturbances of the peace. For example, when neighbors or their teenagers host
occasional parties with loud music and courteously inform each other of the event and
possible parking congestion. However, when this becomes a regular activity and neighbors
have been approached to no avail it would not be unreasonable to ask law enforcement
officers to intervene in terms of the applicable by-law, and to resort to the courts only as a
last resort to seek an interdict to stop such events from recurring.
In Gien v Gien 1979 (T)133, a case that can be described as “nuisance in the narrow
sense”134, two brothers were neighbors. The one brother was granted an interdict in terms
of which his brother was prohibited from using an apparatus meant to ward off baboons
from his property. The loud noise made by the apparatus was a disturbance (nuisance)
and found to be unreasonable. The criterion of reasonableness is examined in the next
Sub-section with some overlap between the four principles.
(iii) The criterion of reasonableness in neighbor law and the four principles135 taken into
consideration in its application.
I contend that if the criterion of reasonableness and its principles were applied to the
Ellaurie case, the interdict may not necessarily have been denied:
“(a) The nuisance must usually be repetitive or continuous, since a single action
of short duration must be tolerated, except if there is a reasonable expectation
that the activity will be repeated.”
Do the five daily adhans fall within this category?
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The Judge, although he indicates that he did not do so “lightly”, granted an interdict
in favor of Mr. Ellaurie on the legal basis that he had established that the adhan “interferes
with his private space”.136
“[T]he Call to Prayer by the Madrasah is made five times a day. A person
standing outside, in the premises of the Madrasah makes the first call at 03h30
in the morning. [T]he Call to Prayer is a foreign sound, which invades his private
space. It bears down over to him. It deprives him of the enjoyment of his property and
interrupts his peace and quiet. It further disrupts his sleep, listening to music
and meditation.”137
Mr. Ellaurie’s assertion that the adhan is a “foreign sound” may be discounted by the
fact that the Isipingo Beach Mosque was established in the area some four years after his
family moved in. He also indicated to me that he found the sound to be “foreign to South
Africa”. Although Dutch colonization inadvertently imported it into South Africa along
with Muslims, it has been rendered here for some 223 years and can therefore hardly be
considered to still be foreign. It is also possible that it might refer to its intrusive nature
(from the outside into the privacy of the property) rather than solely to the foreignness of
the Arabic language.
Mr. Ellaurie’s complaint about the timing of the early dawn prayer is not unjustified
(especially since it is the only adhan confirming that prayer is better than sleep). The timing
of the first (dawn) prayer may be deemed unreasonable. Mr. Ellaurie may reasonably be
aggrieved by the fact that the first (of five) daily adhans is recited very early in the morning
(prior to sunrise) while he may still be asleep, and the fact that all five (amplified, 200
meters away, and unamplified, 20 meters away) adhans are sounded within close proximity
to his home. In fact, Mr. Ellaurie estimated the annual number of adhans as follows: “five
times a day, hundred and fifty times a month, and over eighteen hundred times a year”.138
One prayer (the fifth and last) takes places at night after the fourth (sunset) prayer.
Although each adhan only last for a few minutes, the fact of a nuisance and its
repetition, rather than its duration, is at issue when determining noise nuisance in South
Africa.
In applying the criterion of reasonableness, the AD in the case of Prinsloo v Shaw 1938
(A)139 held that “the holding of noisy religious exercises several times per day, which were
usually accompanied by the clapping of hands and the stamping of feet, was prohibited by
an interdict”.140
In the Prinsloo case141, the applicant was the owner of a house in a residential area.
The respondent, his neighbor, was a leader of a religious organization who also used his
premises to conduct religious services. The distance between their properties was some 21
meters. Services were held on the neighbor’s property three times a day, on three days of
the week. On the remaining four days of the week there was another service. The Judge in
the Ellaurie case unfortunately did not consider the Prinsloo case.
“(b) Only annoying actions which would be unreasonable in the opinion of the
community can be seen as an unusual activity.”
This Section will highlight that, when it comes to establishing whether noise amounts
to nuisance, the role of community “opinion” is an important determinant in the criterion
of reasonableness. However, there is no reference to empirical research about community
responses to noise nuisance in the Ellaurie case.
Wide media coverage (not included in this article due to space constraints) highlighted
that the “community” had expressed support for the adhan being rendered from the
Madrassa. Several Muslim religious (ulama) bodies expressed their objections to the
Ellaurie judgment and to the lowering (misconstrued as silencing) of the volume of the
adhan. These included the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama South Africa (SJUSA) (Durban, South
Africa)142, the Jamiatul Ulama KwaZulu-Natal (JUKZN)143, and the MJC in the Western
Cape144. However, comment by particular groups and institutions, or on any kind of media,
is, or may not, necessarily be representative of general/predominant community views
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and is therefore also not a measure of the correctness or incorrectness of a judgment. De
facto representative community views would have to be ascertained by empirical methods.
For example, there are a number of Hindu temples, mosques (besides the two mosques
referred to in this article) and churches in the Isipingo area. When it comes to public voices,
it is therefore also important to consider the phenomenon of a “spiral of silence”145 and a
possible “silent majority”, which is not detected by only weighing vocal opinions.
The Judge, when referring to his refusal to grant Mr. Ellaurie’s requested relief of
banning the Madrassa from the area, made a similar observation regarding a lack of
empirical evidence. The Judge146 pointed out:
“The applicant states . . . that . . . he was acting on behalf of himself as well as in
the public interest. He, however, had no answers when asked which public he was
acting on behalf of, or who had given him authority to act. In my view, there is
no evidence as to which members of the public share the applicant’s sentiments relating
to Islam. On an issue where the public is divided, an individual cannot claim to act on
behalf of the public.”
In doing so the Judge is stating (confirming) that there is diversity of opinion in the
community. However, although the Judge alluded to differences of opinion, there appears
to be no formal empirical evidence in the case to this effect.
In Section 2 (ii) and Section 4, I argued (in respect to the Bo-Kaap and the unamplified
adhan as “living” heritage) that a consideration would be the size of a religious group in a
particular community. While this could apply to any religion or culture, more specifically:
would this also apply in contexts where Muslims form a minority and others might find it
an imposition? If the adhan only serves to call Muslims to prayer, and they are a minority
(as they are in KwaZulu-Natal), would not the nuisance to the majority community be of
greater weight? Although it can be inferred from information attributed to Mr. Ellaurie
that the adhan gave the Isipingo area “a distinctly Muslim atmosphere” and “[t]he Muslim
community in the area has increased by 30 percent in the past 15 years”147, no empirical
evidence is provided in the case to indicate that Muslims may outnumber other religious
groups in Isipingo. If Muslims did constitute a majority in the area, it could have made the
case for an unamplified (or amplified) adhan to be rendered stronger, but not necessarily
that it could continue unhindered and unimpacted by noise nuisance regulations in the
relevant by-law.
“(c) The action or activity must be a nuisance according to a normal person.”
According to the AD in Prinsloo v Shaw148:
“A resident in a town, and more particularly a resident in a residential neigh-
borhood, is entitled to the ordinary comfort and convenience of his home, and
if owing to the actions of his neighbor he is subjected to annoyance or inconve-
nience greater than that to which a normal person must be expected to submit
in contact with his fellow-men, then he has a legal remedy. The standard taken
must be the standard not of the perverse or finicking or over-scrupulous person, but of
the normal man of sound and liberal tastes and habits.”
As detailed in Section 5 (i), Mr. Ellaurie was characterized as an “Islamophobe” and
maybe unfairly so.
In many apartheid-designated Indian neighborhoods (after forced removals because
of the Group Areas Act) mosques, temples and churches often co-exist harmoniously as
centers of religious and cultural activities for their residents. However, this does not mean
that complaints cannot be justifiably lodged.
Muslim retired or elderly people living in the vicinity of a mosque usually both await
and welcome the call and/or opportunity to perform prayers in congregation at the mosque
since it is often a means for social contact with peers outside of the home. However, a small
singled out group may not be equated with “the greater good of neighbors”. Moreover,
if age, disability (example, hearing impairment) and vulnerability are to be introduced
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as criteria, these must be applied in a balanced way, looking at all vulnerable groups,
including those who are negatively affected by the adhan, such as people with sleep
impairments, hypersensitivity, etc. Mr. Ellaurie’s complaint may therefore be warranted. It
is indicated in the case that the adhan “interrupts” Mr. Ellaurie’s “peace and quiet” and
“disrupts his sleep, listening to music and meditation” (Para. 6).
“(d) Aspects like the location of the properties, the zoning of the properties as
residential, business or industrial areas, the habits of the inhabitants and the
question whether the health of the neighbor might be affected, are important in
the determination of the reasonableness of the actions.”
Although Mr. Ellaurie may allude otherwise149, the properties of the Madrassa
(and zoned for such use) relevant to the case “ . . . are in a residential suburb within the
jurisdictional area of the second respondent [eThekwini Municipality]”.150
It was only after the attainment of democracy in South Africa in 1994 that racial
segregation and apartheid laws like the Group Areas Act No.41 of 1950 were abolished.
It is, therefore, contended that the argument that Mr. Ellaurie’s family lived in Isipingo
before the Madrassa and its mosque were established there, although a factor, cannot be
the deciding factor that should be taken into consideration. The family moved into an
area classified as Indian and where it can reasonably be expected that Indians of diverse
religions (including Hindu and Muslim) will establish mosques, temples and churches, as
indeed was the case. A similar argument holds true for non-Muslims moving into areas
in the Western Cape where Muslims may no longer live in sizeable numbers but where
mosques already exist and are still in use (for example, the single noise complaint directed
against the Muir Street mosque by a current resident) and also against mosques in the
Bo-Kaap (a heritage site that has attracted many foreigners151 to buy residential properties
in the area).
In fact, according to Mngadi, J “[i]t could be argued that [Mr. Ellaurie] moves away
from the area . . . ”152 In Allaclas Investments (Pty) Ltd. & Another v Milnerton Golf Club &
Others [2007] 167 SCA (RSA), the SCA overturned the ruling of the court a quo153 and found
that golf balls from a neighboring golf course infringed on the home owner’s enjoyment
of his property. Although the golf course had been in existence since 1925 and the home
owner only moved into his house in 2003, a mandatory interdict that the Golf Club must
prevent such infringement was granted.154 Judge Farlam155, citing De Charmoy v Day Star
Hatchery (Pty) Ltd. 1967 (4) SA 188 (D) at 192 A-B, made it clear that when home owners
live near a golf course, it would not be unreasonable to expect them to endure some form
of nuisance caused by “badly hit golf balls”. However, citing Assagay Quarries (Pty) Ltd.
v Hobbs 1960 (4) SA 237 (N) at 240 G, the Judge highlighted that the nuisance that the
appellants had to endure was much more than what they were expected to tolerate in terms
of the application of the principle of “give and take, live and let live”, which forms the basis
of South African law on this point. The Judge was mindful that the golf course had been in
existence since 1925 and that, when the property was purchased, the first appellant was
aware that it was next to a golf course. While the Judge opined that this would ordinarily
have been a relevant factor, “it is clear that the appellants did not know that the hole was badly
designed and gave rise to the safety concerns” (emphasis added).
I have pointed out that reasonableness applies to the activity complained of and not
whether the neighbor (the Madrassa) was being reasonable. It is stated in the case that the
Madrassa gives the further assurance that “[n]o external sound amplification is used in
making the Call to Prayer”156 and that it “ . . . has no intention of using external sound
amplification [even] in the future”.157 Although in the Allaclas case (Paras. 8 and 19) a
preventative measure (construction of a high net to stop golf balls) appeared to be of little
help, this could also have been construed as a proactive step on the Madrassa’s part to not
further increase the volume of the adhan. Despite the assurances that it did not, and did not
intend to, use amplification, the Judge failed to give any real consideration to the fact that
the adhan was not an unusual activity for the Madrassa and the right to manifest religious
belief of those worshipping, teaching and learning at the Madrassa.158 I contend that had
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the management of the Madrassa applied to the Municipality to use its voice amplification
system and if it did so within the parameters of the law, this would have resulted in
greater disturbance to Mr. Ellaurie. The fact that there is already a community mosque in
the vicinity of the Madrassa that uses a voice amplification system is probably why the
Madrassa, in consideration of its neighbors, would have considered it to be duplicitous
for it to also render the adhan over its own voice amplification system. Given the timing
of the adhans, it would have resulted in a cacophony of colliding sounds which would
have caused a further noise nuisance for the residents of the area, including Mr. Ellaurie.
This may also be why Mr. Ellaurie decided to be proactive and call for the cessation of the
Madrassa’s broadcasting of both forms of adhans in his Founding Affidavit.159
While the Allaclas case reminds us that each case is decided on its own merits (in this
case its unique deciding factor was a “badly designed hole”), it is also evident from the
Durban and Natal cases cited by Judge Farlam that the Judge in the Ellaurie case failed to
apply the precedents of his own province.
Thus, if there are mosques from which amplified adhans are rendered in contravention
of municipal by-laws, then irate neighbors are not necessarily obliged to tolerate them in
terms of the principle of “give and take” or “live and let live”. In fact, even if the adhans
do comply, they can still be found to be unreasonable and such conduct could still be
interdicted. In the Ellaurie case it should also not have mattered, or been of much relevance,
that Mr. Ellaurie moved into the Isipingo Beach area before the Madrassa was established.
By the same logic, the SCA ruling also implies that even if non-Muslim residents in Bo-Kaap
in Cape Town moved in after the establishment of mosques in the area, the volume of the
adhans rendered from their precincts must not be in excess of the by-laws. This does not
detract from the fact that the adhan is a religious symbol and its sounding an integral part
of the rich cultural and historical make-up of the area. The decision in the Ellaurie case
should be overturned because it had little, if any, sound basis in either public or private
law and case law. If not, it may yet have dire ramifications not only for the adhan but for
the symbols of other religions and cultures since sounds emitted from all religious symbols
can be defined as “noise”.
6. Some Recommendations for the Way Forward
The adhan is an integral part of Islam and the culture of South African Muslims.
In addition to the physical rendering of adhans from mosques, and not in lieu thereof,
pre-recorded adhans are also broadcast in homes using radio and television transmissions.
Recently, more people are utilizing digital technology like dedicated adhan apps on cellular
(mobile) phones. Although it is broadcast over dedicated Muslim radio stations five times a
day, this does not preclude (nor do I foresee it replacing it anytime soon) its daily rendition
from mosques (with and without amplification) five times a day. Nor did it preclude it
during the COVID-19 lockdown periods when government, with the support of most
Muslim religious scholars (ulama), ordered the formal closure of mosques. For this reason,
the local suggestion (in the Garden Cities case) of “using a light on top of a minaret” in
lieu of the adhan to signal the call to prayer, will not work in South Africa. I propose that
for the sake of good neighborliness that the ulama continue along this forward-thinking
trajectory as far as the adhan is concerned.
While there are other judgments that do (Garden Cities), it is unfortunate that the
Ellaurie judgment does not, set a credible precedent on the law relating to the adhan in
South Africa. To make the job of municipalities (and ultimately, the courts) easier, and
in keeping with some of the recommendations made by the SAHRC in respect of the
Isipingo Beach Mosque (as detailed in Para. 8160 of the Ellaurie case), I recommend that
the two major national ulama (religious) umbrella bodies in South Africa, the Jamiatul
Ulama of South Africa (JUSA) established in 1970, and the United Ulama Council of South
Africa (UUCSA) established in 1994161, although they usually compete with each other,
collaborate to issue formal legal opinions or directives known as fatawas (singular, fatwa)
(as was suggested in Indonesia162) in order to provide the imams and managements of
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mosques located in the different provinces with uniform guidance as to the regulation
of both the sound volume and timing of adhans. The provinces referred to in this article
each have their own Muslim theological bodies and imams of mosques are members of
these organizations. These local bodies are also members of the national bodies. This will
ensure a, more or less, uniform rendering of amplified and unamplified adhans along the
following lines:
A dedicated muezzin should ideally be appointed and should preferably be
schooled in both the art of rendering the adhan and the proper use of modern
technology (microphones and sound amplification); an adhan should be timed to
not last longer than three to five minutes; if there is more than one mosque in a
neighborhood, the timing of the adhans should be synchronized to avoid further
noise nuisance; since according to the Hanafite school of law (which the Madrassa
follows), the timing (waqt) of the late afternoon prayer (asr) commences much
later than is the case for all the other schools, a comprise should be reached so
that the adhan for this prayer is only rendered once; to avoid potential clashes
with the provisions of municipal by-laws (which generally do not allow for noise
nuisances early in the morning or late at night), the adhan for the first (dawn)
and last (late night) of the five daily prayers should be unamplified (loudspeaker
muted) and recited only by human voice preferably within the precincts of the
mosque rather than atop a minaret; not only does the timing of adhans vary
according to the season, but the sounding of the first adhan at dawn occurs when
most people may still be asleep and the final adhan occurs at night when some
people may have just retired to bed. Some Muslims, young and old, who may
not be able to perform prayers, or who may not be as devoted to performing
their prayers on time, may also welcome this consideration. Since it would
be difficult to distinguish between noise levels resulting from the adhan from
general community noises in the area, the remaining three adhans should be
allowed to be rendered through amplification; given that, for practical reasons,
mosques may not be able to afford the appointment of dedicated muezzins, and
that therefore the random persons (imam, muezzin, caretaker, or failing them, a
worshipper present in the mosque) rendering the adhan may differ on a daily
basis, to obviate both the discretion and disparity of the reciter, the sounding
of the amplified adhans for the remaining three compulsory prayers, and those
rendered for weekly, and occasional celebratory, congregational prayers, should
be fixed at a moderate tone (as is the case in Pakistan163) and an appropriate
decibel level in conformity with municipal by-laws and through collaboration
and consultation between ulama and municipalities (as representatives of the
State). Along the lines of their counterparts in Singapore164, consideration should
be given to issuing a national fatwa to the effect that the loudspeakers of new
or proposed mosques be directed towards the interior in order to minimize
noise. Given that the duration of these adhans may be short-lived, they should
be tolerated as long as they comply with the noise parameters of by-laws; the
sounding of unamplified adhans are also subject to by-laws and should therefore
strive to be reasonable. Mosques that do not comply with the fatawas should
be disciplined.
Although the Madrassa may contend that the adhan is technically rendered from
inside the building, according to Mr. Ellaurie165 (and his video recording appears to
support this) the unamplified adhan from the Madrassa’s mosque was rendered from
outside of the mosque, though not from a minaret. Since the nearby Isipingo Mosque
uses amplification, I proffer the following suggestions for the Madrassa’s mosque, and my
rationale therefor, as a reasonable compromise. The Madrassa could reduce the volume
of its unamplified adhan to a moderate level and strive to regulate its volume (which it
admits can vary due to a range of factors) in accordance with some of the recommendations
proffered in this Section. It could also consider rendering the first (dawn) and last (night)
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adhans from inside its mosque. Given other peripheral and surrounding noises in the area
during the day which residents are in any case subjected to, the remaining adhans could
still be rendered from outside. Since the Madrassa’s adhan is meant primarily for its staff
and students (some of whom live on the premises), doing so will not only pose less of a
noise nuisance to especially its non-Muslim neighbors like Mr. Ellaurie, but will engender
harmonious relationships and go a long way in fostering social cohesion.
Such compromise and accommodation would find condonation in the two primary
sources of Islam, namely, the Qur’an and Sunna. Muslims regard the Prophet Muhammad
as a role model and aspire to emulate his character and behavior. South African Muslims
should therefore be mindful of the numerous rights he bestowed upon neighbors, and his
tolerant behavior even towards a disrespectful neighbor, who both vilified his character and
physically harmed him. The seventh century Qur’an is likened to a religious Constitution
by Muslims. The following Qur’anic verse can be interpreted to advocate mutual rights and
duties of neighbors regardless of their nearness to, or physical distance from, each other: “
. . . do good- to . . . neighbors who are near [and] neighbors who are strangers [far]”.166
It is also evident from several, including authentic, traditions (ahadith)167 attributed to
the Prophet of Islam, that good and kind treatment of neighbors is part and parcel of the
conduct of being Muslim (faith).
The South African Constitution (supreme law) both safeguards and limits the diverse
religious, cultural and customary rights, practices and identities of its citizens. The role that
mosques can play in educating neighbors about the purpose of the adhan in the religious
practice of Muslims is an important element in contributing to good neighborliness and
avoiding unnecessary lawsuits and complaints based on possible or perceived Islamo-
phobia. A successful practical example of fostering a climate of religious tolerance and
interfaith dialogue is the participation of some 45 mosques from six provinces in South
Africa in the 2019 “National Mosque Open Day” hosted by the South African Muslim
Network (SAMNET), an NGO located in Durban, and in which over 2000 people of various
faiths participated.168
In order to avoid unnecessary complaints, lawsuits and friction among neighbors, I
recommend the following as a further way forward. The City of Cape Town municipal
by-laws are in the process of being amended and this may be a good opportunity to emulate
and model some of the unique provisions of the Noise Management System of the City
of Tshwane referred to in Section 4. Municipalities should also not wait for mosques to
comply with their by-laws. Instead, they should be proactive and undertake regular site
visits and inspections to assist mosques, that do not have the requisite permission to render
amplified adhans, with their applications, and to ensure that, as part of responsible mosque
administration, those who have such permission do not abuse this privilege.
7. Conclusions
This article has approached the position of the adhan in South Africa from the per-
spective of both legislation and case law.
Although both forms are permitted, the traditional rendering of the adhan through
human voice, though not its later amplification, is an integral part of Islam. This religious
position has been reaffirmed in the Indian cases and in the Garden Cities case. Nonetheless,
although the adhan is a Sunna (tradition) introduced by the Prophet Muhammad some 1400
years ago and therefore not compulsory, it has been practiced since then without becoming
outdated. The adhan is primarily used for spiritual purposes, its main purpose being to
remind Muslims to heed the call to prayer, not to force them to do so. A Muslim’s faith is
not measured by the loudness of the adhan and mosques that do not use loudspeakers or
microphones still perform their religious function.
As far as the amplified adhan is concerned, Renteln169 astutely observes:
“As people migrated to live in pluralistic societies, the sound of the adhan has
sometimes been startling to others. Because of its frequency and volume, there
has been, in some quarters, little tolerance for it.”
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Although, as detailed in Section 2 (ii) and Section 4, we are now having to contend with
similar situations in the District Six and Bo-Kaap areas, the dynamics of forced removals
during apartheid makes the comparison different in South Africa. Past discriminations
against Muslims in South Africa support the argument that religious diversity should be
celebrated and protected to avoid the injustices of the past. This, after all, is the main aim
of the Constitution. The size of a community should be of little or no consequence when it
comes to the rendering of amplified adhans that have not sought approval, or those that did
but still do not comply with by-laws. However, I contend that it should make a difference
whether a religious group is a minority or the majority when it comes to permitting the
rendering of an unamplified adhan. If it is the majority, it should be allowed. However,
this form of rendering may also be subject to restriction if found to be unreasonable.
In South Africa all religions are accorded equitable treatment under the final Constitu-
tion. The practices of all religions may therefore be considered to constitute a noise nuisance.
By-laws aim to regulate the volume of all religious sounds and all religious symbols are
subject to its provisions. The general implications of the Ellaurie case for religious tolerance
and use of religious symbols may therefore be far-reaching. Singling out the adhan for
attenuation (lessening volume) would be unlawful and amount to discrimination on the
basis of religion. If, rather than loudspeakers or other forms of amplification, recourse
should instead be had to readily available forms of “digital technologies”, as suggested
by some critics of an amplified adhan, then this implies that all religions, including Mr.
Ellaurie’s Hinduism, will have to resort to these modes.
Noise pollution in relation to religion is a sensitive issue and ultimately one that
mediation (which proved inconclusive between Mr. Ellaurie and the Madrassa), by-laws or
the Constitution may not resolve amicably.
Section 5 highlights some instances in the Ellaurie case where opposite conclusions
can be derived from the discussion of reasonableness and that Mr. Ellaurie’s noise nuisance
complaint may not necessarily have been unreasonable. Nonetheless, I conclude that
the Madrassa’s appeal, if it continues, should meet with success. Judge Mngadi ignored
precedent, set a poor precedent by ignoring property law, and misapplied constitutional
law. Given, too, his failure to apply the law to the facts, questions of a fair trial (though not
a mistrial) and bias also arise. Procedurally a mistrial cannot be declared after the trial has
been finalized; at best, the appeals procedure is available. All of these lead me to believe
that the Ellaurie case will be overturned on appeal. I further conclude that the Ellaurie case
may not withstand constitutional challenge should the Madrassa opt for that further route
if its current appeal fails.
Notions of transformative constitutionalism and the spirit of “ubuntu” (an African
concept that has been translated as “the essence of being human”170) characterize South
Africa’s constitutional democracy. If need be, it is hoped that the Ellaurie case proceeds all
the way to the Constitutional Court so that a guiding national precedent can be set to deal
with complaints against contestable adhans whether rendered through human voice or
over loudspeakers.
Even if, as proposed for the City of Cape Town, by-laws were to exempt religious
activity from its ambit, ultimately, unamplified, unduly amplified (unauthorized) and
duly amplified (authorized) adhans may all yet be found to constitute a noise nuisance in
South Africa and restricted, if challenged and found to be unreasonable. Support for this is
found in the similar provisions of by-laws and the limitation clause of the Constitution. If
compliant with municipal guidelines, both forms of the adhan should be tolerated and not
unduly challenged.
As Justice Sachs stated in the Fourie case pertaining to same-sex relations but which,
as a precedent setting case, remains relevant:
“[W]hat is at stake is not simply a question of removing an injustice experienced
by a particular section of the community. At issue is a need to affirm the very
character of our society as one based on tolerance and mutual respect. The test of
tolerance is not how one finds space for people with whom, and practices with
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which, one feels comfortable, but how one accommodates the expression of what
is discomfiting.”171
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